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ABSTRACT 
When people hear the word “terrorism,” images of the chaos caused by 
large, violent attacks and the horrific events of September 11, 2001, usually flood 
imaginations and captivate attentions. All of these events depict the very real 
threat of physical violence, death, and destruction perpetrated by terrorists against 
the masses. These attacks targeting the masses also dominate current strategic 
policy conversations and academic study. However, the power and utility of more 
focused and personalized terrorism tactics targeting key influential leaders remain 
widely unappreciated and undertheorized. If terrorists are constantly adapting and 
calculating operational risks versus rewards during their selection of tactics and 
strategy, whom will they choose to target and how? Will they target populations or 
the key individuals who control these populations? This work highlights the 
following indicators and observations that could lead to a future rise and resurgence of 
personalized terrorism tactics against key leaders: increased counterterrorism 
proficiency in a post-9/11 world, improved technologies/the power of media, and a 
historical blueprint of previous applications of personalized terrorism tactics. These 
factors serve as powerful motivators for pragmatic terrorists or terrorist organizations 
to change their target selections and tactics, but may not influence a radical ideologue. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a leader of a nation or a large international organization. As a key 
personality and leader, you hold the ability to change policies, make critical decisions, and 
your daily behaviors effect millions of third party actors. Now imagine while holding this 
position of influence, you become a victim of terrorism. You are not injured or killed during 
any terrorist attack, but the wellbeing of something valuable in your life is now under direct 
personal threat. Possibly the fate of a kidnapped loved one is at stake, or terrorists have 
hacked into your personal mobile device and now have control of some embarrassing 
information they are threatening to distribute if their demands are not met. Maybe you have 
just received a threating form of credible correspondence, demanding that you change your 
ways or execute requested actions. Your family members, your reputation, your 
relationships, your finances, and your political power could be under attack. You quickly 
realize that the actions you take, or not take in this pressurized moment will have a lasting 
effect upon your own life, but also for anyone or anything that falls within your sphere of 
influence. These scenarios commonly appear as plotlines in movies and TV shows, but 
now thanks to successful counterterrorism (CT) efforts and enabling technologies they 
could become more popular terrorist tactics. In these cases, the terrorists have taken the 
initiative, control the situation, and have gained a marked advantage they have never 
previously enjoyed. You are now a victim of personalized terrorism tactics (PTT). 
Predicting future waves and trends in global terrorism is no easy task, but its 
practice proves essential in providing any chance of success in combating the various 
threats that emerge in modern day society. With terrorism, the stakes are too high to 
exclude any feasible predictions. From academics to military strategists, and upwards to 
national level leaders, all parties involved continue to struggle to foresee when and how 
the next terrorist event will unfold. Nations and whole societies often find themselves 
caught off-guard and falling victim to the shock that new forms of terrorism cause. This 
thesis aims to explain the strategic logic and indicators behind future terrorists choosing to 
employ more personalized tactics direct towards influential targets to achieve their 
objectives. This work explains the continuous existence and highlights the potential 
2 
resurgence of PTT tailored down specifically to individual audiences and targets, who hold 
the sole ability to give terrorists what they want. Instead of targeting and influencing 
masses of people, terrorists may only need to exert pressure towards one key individual. 
The increased presence of more PTT in the future could stem from indicators 
throughout the current operational environment and hold historical precedence. These 
predictions of terrorism’s future trends derive specifically from an increased CT 
proficiency in a post-9/11 world, enabling technological advances / mass media available 
to terrorists, and a historical blueprint of previous applications of personalized terrorism 
tactics. These indicators and catalysts create the foundation for a potential increase in PTT. 
Our first step is to understand the definition of PTT in this context, its potential for 
increased use, and its overall effectiveness as a terrorism strategy. 
A. DEFINING PERSONALIZED TERRORISM TACTICS
For this research, PTT are defined as “the use of force, threats, or coercion by a
terrorist or terrorist organization directly against an individual or a valued aspect of that 
influential target’s life. When employed successfully, these tactics and fear effectively 
exploit a target and force them to change their behaviors and/or policies they control, or 
capitulate to demands under the stress and pressure of perceived consequences.” These 
consequences could range from the simple capitulation to specific terrorist demands, to the 
overarching degradation of governments, and they could vary based upon the capabilities 
and desires of terrorists. PTT often appear in the following terrorist’s actions: kidnapping 
for ransom, hostage taking, intimidation, blackmail, extortion, or direct assassinations. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) definition of terrorism as, “the 
unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence, instilling fear and terror, against 
individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, or 
to gain control over a population, to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives”1 
1 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), 





is one of the most complete definitions available. NATO’s definition results from the 
overall agreement of 29 nations, all of whom are committed (in varying degrees) to 
combating international terrorism. This definition serves as an adequate baseline, but 
applies mainly to conventional wisdom and focuses mainly on the protection of whole 
societies. 
PTT anchor their power in distinct coercive actions and individualized fear, 
explained best in the portions of NATO’s definition referencing the “threatened use of 
force or violence, instilling fear and terror”2 The effects of PTT are often intangible. 
Calculating the amount of fear, coercion, and pressure an individual target of PTT 
experiences during a given situation proves to be quiet difficult and analytically subjective. 
However, these elements of human emotion and interaction have always existed. Terrorists 
and other nefarious actors seeking to gain a marked advantage during a conflict have 
always exploited these applications of fear. They are merely difficult to visualize, 
situationally dependent, and create different effects upon individual targets; and therefore 
become underappreciated. 
Terrorism usually hinges on kinetic and violent actions directed towards large 
audiences. These acts of violence are tangible and simple to measure following a dramatic 
terrorist event. This perception points to the over emphasis and focus on kinetic terrorist 
tactics among national security experts, and the lack of study into more singular and 
personalized methods within academia. Today, the psychological strength of non-kinetic 
terrorist tactics and the substantial effects they can cause on a specific target often go 
unnoticed in favor of analyzing large-scale or generalized events. Characterized by so 
much more than just physical acts, terrorism relies on the successful projection of credible 
fear. Fear is an emotion that varies in severity between individuals, but nonetheless exists 
and proves to be a quite powerful instrument of persuasion. Charles Darwin discussed the 
debilitating effects fear inflicts upon humans in his work The Expression and Emotions in 
Man and Animals (1872), in which the effects would often culminate in a failure of mental 
2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 
4 
ability and agility.3 Terrorists intend for their tactics to create this debilitating effect upon 
their intended targets. They wish to gain control of the situation, and seek advantage. 
Targeting people’s fear—whether through direct acts of terrorism or the threat of terrorism 
may not be immediately apparent, but over time could have severe consequences.4 The 
effects of fear and anxiety are different for everyone. It is important to understand that 
terrorism is a form of psychological warfare, in which terrorists seek to illicit irrational 
responses and create profound emotional impacts upon its targets.5  
Terrorists can either exert force in a direct or an indirect manner against their 
intended targets. Terrorism tactics can possess either of these two polarizing and often 
symbiotic approaches, but terrorism’s success hinges upon the expert application of both 
at varying times. Direct terrorist tactics would be the employment of any of the previously 
mentioned tactics against a specific key leader, rather than the execution of a car bomb 
attack in a local marketplace for example, or an armed assault upon a public venue. The 
transfer of force and pressure during the projection of PTT is direct, and with no 
intermediary. A proxy actor or state sponsor at times may be involved, but the transfer of 
force itself remains dyadic, often originating from the terrorist or terrorist group, and 
propelled directly towards a target for a desired immediate effect. 
Adversely, the application of terrorism against entire populations or groups 
indirectly, and in a less personalized manner, attempts to influence key leaders and 
governments from afar. This approach lacks any intimate and emotional connective tissue 
between the victims of a terrorist act, and the decision makers forced to react. A terrorist 
detonating a suicide vest in a crowded marketplace, resulting in the deaths of dozens of 
                                                 
3 Samuel Justin Sinclair and Daniel Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 153. Also see Charles Darwin and Phillip Prodger, The Expressions of the Emotions 




4 Sinclair and Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears, 155.  
5 Bruce Hoffman “The Emergence of the New Terrorism,” in The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends 
and Counter-Strategies, ed. Tan, Andrew and Ramakrishna, Kumar (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 
2002), 45. 
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people, may have a very direct effect on numerous families and businesses; the action lacks 
immediate, intimate, and emotional value directly to a key leader. A good leader will of 
course be motivated to prevent such an attack from happening again, but they will handle 
the situation much differently than if the attack affected them directly. This indirect 
approach is also a strategic gamble, which has a long history of being “coercively 
ineffective.”6 By attacking the masses, terrorists run the risk of killing innocents and those 
not even involved in the conflict at hand. Terrorists may accept these risks and 
consequences based upon their ideological rationales for action, but this approach still runs 
the risk of alienating the masses more than converting them to a terrorist’s cause. In Max 
Abrahm’s 2006 “study of 28 well-known terrorist campaigns, he discovered that terrorist 
organizations achieved their stated political goals zero percent of the time by attacking 
civilians.”7 Instead of hoping for a desired effect or outcome by attacking large and often 
innocent groups of people, terrorists could focus force and their tactics directly towards the 
key leaders and personalities who hold the power to influence change. This approach may 
not encompass an entire terror campaign, but it may be quite effective in gaining specific 
goals and obtaining tactical level victories for terrorists. 
PTT exerted against key leaders could also differ from indirect tactics against the 
masses by often exhibiting non-kinetic symptoms; leveraging the fear of physical violence 
or destruction against a valued aspect of the target’s life that is often unrelated to the 
immediate conflict at large (see Figure 1). However, terrorist may gain leverage for the 
successful employment of PTT by first exercising kinetic actions. PTT may only aim to 
harass, delegitimize or exploit their targets into making desired behavioral changes under 
duress. Lethality only needs to be understood by the target as a feasible and undesirable 
outcome. PTT commonly take the form of kidnappings, hostage taking, extortion, and 
blackmail aimed at pressuring a specific target to meet terrorist’s demands, or change their 
behaviors. By employing PTT, terrorists attempt to gain control of something of value in 
                                                 
6 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
International Security, 32 (Spring 2008), 82–84. 
7 Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 83. Also 
see Max Abrahms, “Why Terrorism Does Not Work,” International Security, 31, no. 2 (2006), 42–78. 
6 
their target of influence’s life; something they are able to gain control of physically easier 
than the actual target itself. This instantly creates attention for any terrorist, and provides 
them a seat at the negotiating table. 
The only common denominator for both direct and indirect forms of terrorism are 
a terrorist’s desire to incite fear in their intended target(s). “The psychology of fear is truly 
the underlying psychology of terrorism itself.”8 Fear created by terrorism often manifests 
itself in an anticipatory manner.9 This anticipatory fear derives from credible threats made 
by terrorists holding a position of advantage against their targeted audience; the target fears 
what could happen if they do not capitulate with terrorists’ demands, resulting in the 
target’s decision making and response process being manipulated. Whether terrorists 
decide to use PTT, opt for an indirect expression of force, or choose a mixture of the two 
strategies, their objectives remain the same in attempting to influence by instilling credible 
fear. Which strategy is most cost effective, encompasses the least risk, and drives a terrorist 
closer to their desired outcomes? All these questions constantly weigh into terrorists’ 
calculations of operational risks versus rewards and assist them in their selection of tactics. 
                                                 
8 Sinclair and Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears, 155. 
9 Rowell L. Huesmann, “Forward,” in The Psychology of Terrorism Fears, ed. Samuel Justin Sinclair 
and Daniel Antonius (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), viii – ix. 
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This diagram depicts an example application of PTT projected upon a national leader of a 
targeted government (or any key leader) by a terrorist or terrorist organization. By 
conducting an action against valuable aspects of the target’s life, a terrorist is able to 
influence the targeted key leader directly and inflict desired changes. 
Figure 1. Example Flow Chart of PTT 
B. STRATEGIC LOGIC BEHIND THE RISE OF PTT 
The identification, discussion, and predictions regarding the potential rise of PTT in 
the future hinges upon the effectiveness of current CT efforts, enabling technologies and 
media, and past historical uses of PTT. All these factors combined create a strategic logic for 
a potential rise in PTT. Applying Gordon McCormick’s 2003 work, Terrorist Decision 
Making, terrorist could choose to employ PTT based upon both strategic and psychological 
8 
theoretical arguments.10 These theories suggest that terrorists select their tactics through a 
rational evaluation of their strategic environment and their own individual thought processes. 
Opposing theorists and other terrorism experts agree that terrorism is not going to 
disappear, and that it remains a viable “strategy of struggle”11 Where opinions differ, is with 
exactly how terrorists will conduct their business, and their selection of tactics. Much of this 
debate centers on what terrorists want and how do they make decisions. Ariel Merari claims 
in 1999–2000, “…that the organizational features of terrorism cannot change, and the use of 
technology in terrorist warfare is limited, partly by the organizational characteristics of this 
form of struggle and partly by the psychological, social and political context within which 
terrorists operate.”12 Due to a terrorist’s need to stay covert and clandestine, Merari believes 
these factors limit the tactics available to terrorists, pigeonholing them to more kinetic 
operations such as bombings, armed assaults, and hostage taking, etc.”13 Merari, along with 
Jenkins, and many other supportive opinions that terrorists are uncreative originated prior to 
September 11, 2001. Conclusions such as Merari’s lack appreciation for terrorist displayed 
creativity and terrorists’ ability to adapt to adversity based upon changes in their operational 
environments. They demonstrate a continued wide-range of opinions regarding future 
terrorist activity, and prove the need for continued debate on the subject. The phenomenon 
of terrorism and its many forms will no doubt continue. Its waves and trends are subject to 
the availability of resources and opportunities for both terrorists themselves and their CT 
opponents, nevertheless, trends and waves still exist. 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks upon 
the U.S. homeland on 9/11 provide striking parallels in both successfully drawing the United 
States into an armed conflict. Often misinterpreted as an example of strategic surprise, the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks inflicted upon the U.S. serve as an excellent example of 
                                                 
10 Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science,6, no. 1 
(2003): 473, https://www.annualreviews.org/doi/pdf/10.1146/annurev.polisci.6.121901.085601. 
11 Ariel Merari, ed., Max Taylor and John Horgan, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle: Past and 
Future,” The Future of Terrorism (Frank Cass Publishers, London (UK) and Portland, OR, 2000), 52–65.  
12 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle,” 55.  
13 Merari, “Terrorism as a Strategy of Struggle,” 55. 
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tactical surprise by an already known terrorist enemy.14 This is critical to remember going 
forward, in this discussion of changing terrorist tactics. The U.S. and the wide variety of CT 
forces across the world understand that terrorism exists, but they struggle to comprehend, 
predict, or limit the next variation of tactics terrorists will choose to employ. An 
understanding of terrorism’s ability to adapt to adversity, the risks involved in waging an 
indirect campaign against the masses rather than directly against key leaders, adds additional 
evidence to this potential strategic thought process. 
1. Logical Terrorist Adaptations 
As the political, social, and technological world changes, so must the tactics of 
terrorism. “Terrorism is perhaps best viewed as the archetypal shark in the water. It must 
constantly move forward to survive and indeed to succeed.”15 Brian Jenkins uses past trends 
to analyze the future of terrorism.16 In 1985, Jenkins believed terrorists to be, “unimaginative 
dullards, content to follow the same script over and over,” and their tactics unlikely to 
change.17 A prediction that the events of September 11, 2001, today’s technological 
advances, and the continued tactical adaptations terrorist fighters display across the world 
over the last two decades, have clearly proven false. Terrorists are byproducts of their 
environments and the resources available to them. Failing to innovate when facing a superior 
state adversary could prove disastrous for their cause. In the past, terrorism benefited greatly 
from the inventions and applications of dynamite, the rotary press, and the telegraph.18 
Today’s modern innovations include the employment of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs), drones, and numerous advantages the internet provides.  
Currently, terrorists are adapting to vast tactical and operational CT successes. They 
continue to work around the physical hardening of potential targets, and struggle to make 
                                                 
14 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. (Los Angeles, CA, CQ press, 2015), 3. 
15 Hoffman, “The Emergence of the New Terrorism,” in The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and 
Counter-Strategies, ed. Tan, Andrew and Ramakrishna, Kumar, 44. 
16 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Future Trends in International Terrorism,” (RAND Paper Series, 
December 1985), 1–30, https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P7176.html 
17 Jenkins, “Future Trends in International Terrorism,” 17.  
18 McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science. 476–477. 
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themselves less vulnerable to detection, capture, and death when facing CT forces. They 
understand their “success is dependent on overcoming the defenses and physical security 
barriers designed to thwart attack.”19 Along with the availability of new resources and 
technologies, terrorist must constantly self-evaluate their practices if they ever want to 
experience operational success. In this learning process, terrorists may begin to realize the 
futility of attacking the masses, and although risky and complex, opt to direct their attention 
to the vulnerabilities of key leaders.  
Abrahms challenges this assumption of terrorist self-evaluation and logical 
adaptations, claiming terrorists are “reflexively uncompromising” or choose to engage in 
terrorism foolishly assuming that it is their only course of action to take for political 
struggle.20 However, this evaluation only applies to terrorist motivations for action, not their 
choice of tactics once already dedicated to a terrorism venture. Terrorist failing to learn from 
their previous experiences and failing to adopt other tactical approaches following 18+ years 
of September 11, 2001, CT efforts would be counter-productive and outright foolish. Their 
selection of tactics may derive directly from a need to survive and remain relevant, collecting 
small victories every so often against the key leaders that are capable of providing them 
quicker gratification. 
2. The Risks of Indirectly Targeting the Masses—Overcoming Ideology 
The risk of alienating potential supporters by killing innocent civilians is not the only 
drawback of a terrorism strategy focused on attacking the masses. Kydd and Walter identify, 
“provocation as one of five principal strategic logics of costly signaling applied to terrorism 
campaigns.”21 Provocation strategies aim to illicit an indiscriminate violence and CT 
overreactions to terrorist activity that will hopefully discredit a regime and throw popular 
support behind a terrorist group. Much like an overreaction by a regime or CT forces, could 
a terrorist organization execute an act or acts of over-provocation? An example of debilitating 
                                                 
19 Hoffman, “The Emergence of the New Terrorism,” in The New Terrorism: Anatomy, Trends and 
Counter-Strategies, ed. Tan, Andrew and Ramakrishna, Kumar, 44. 
20 Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want,” 78–105. 
21 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,” International Security, 31, 
no. 1 (2006): 51. 
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over-provocation was apparent in the brutal campaign against Iraqi Shia waged by Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi. Zaraqawi’s lack of target discrimination during his group’s execution of 
violent terrorism broke not only the threshold of violence acceptable to U.S. and Iraqi 
security forces, but resulted in alienating fellow Muslims, terrorists, and even Al-Qaeda’s 
leader in Bin-Laden himself. Terrorist must be careful not to over-provoke regimes or the 
people they wish to support them. 
Unfortunately, for many terrorists and terrorist groups, their ideologies get in the way 
of pragmatism.22 Ideologies do provide a foundation and motivation for terrorism, but the 
selection of targets and tactics is most successful when it is logic based in the strategic 
environment, rather than purely ideologically driven. A harsh reality remains that many 
extremist terrorists and terrorist groups’ decisions are based upon pure hatred and radical 
ideology. This may cause them to target the masses (or a specific ethnicity, religious group, 
or sect) not because it best suits their desired objectives, but because they intrinsically hate 
them. If leaders of organized terror groups can control the operational actions of its members, 
the chances of over-provoking and incorrectly applying force can be mitigated. Most PTT 
directed towards a key leader must be well-planned and provided necessary resources. Often, 
the employment of PTT requires detailed planning and synchronized lines of effort by 
terrorists, resulting in the successful direct application of personalized pressure. Targeting 
the masses with violent terror attacks only produces indirect political pressure towards key 
leaders instead of demanding immediate results. The value of PTT is that it could result in 
immediate behavioral changes and desired triggered reactions almost instantaneously in 
targeted leadership. 
Most modern day CT protective measures are in place to protect the masses rather 
than individuals or what is important to them. A terrorist today may be less capable of 
sneaking past airport security to hijack a plane, or physically unable to place a bomb at the 
base of a national monument; but the many diverse aspects of key leader’s personal life may 
be easier to influence than ever before, and are often accessible from afar. There will always 
                                                 
22 Charles JM. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 10, no. 2 (1998), 53. 
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be outliers to this argument. Insane or radical terrorists who utilize hate rather than logical 
evaluations of their operational environments will always be a threat to consider. However, 
as professional terrorist (possibly state sponsored) groups and rational lone actor terrorists 
begin to realize the futility of targeting the masses to advance their political or simply 
disruptive agendas, we may see a rise in PTT against select key leaders instead. The most 
recent data provided by the 2018 Global Terrorism Database and Global Terrorism Index 
shows, “the absolute number, prevalence and lethality of terrorist incidents has decreased 
significantly around the world since its peak in 2014.”23 Are terrorists realizing that targeting 
and inflicting terror upon the masses could be an inefficient and ineffective tactic? 
3. The Value of Correctly Targeting Key Leaders 
Both terrorists and CT entities understand the importance of key leaders to 
organizations, nations, and cultures. Terrorists and those who seek to counter terrorists’ 
activities embrace the strategy of targeting key leaders, “yet the history of leadership 
targeting provides a mixed record—for every example of effectiveness, there are similar 
examples of ineffective applications.”24 Failures of leadership targeting by both sides derives 
from misinterpretations and poor evaluations of just how important or critical those leaders 
actually are to the groups they represent. “For leadership targeting to be effective, it must at 
a minimum remove or produce a debilitating effect upon a leader providing either 
inspirational or operational value.”25 When these metrics are not properly considered or are 
subject to bias, an incorrect evaluation of a leader’s value to an organization, nation, or 
society results. U.S. CT intelligence organizations and forces obsess over targeting terrorists 
leaders. The constant execution of high value target raids, the use of precision guided 
                                                 
23 Robert Muggah, “Global Terrorism May Be Down but is Still a Threat in 2019 - Are We Ready?” 
Small Wars Journal (2019), https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/global-terrorism-may-be-down-still-
threat-2019-are-we-ready. Also see “2018 Global Terrorism Index – Wall Chart,” Vision of Humanity, 
2018, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/01/GTI2018-A3-poster-wall-chart.pdf. Also see 
Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring The Impact Of Terrorism 
(Sydney, 2019), http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf. 
24 Michael Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and Its Consequences for Leadership 
Targeting),” Terrorism and Political Violence,26, no. 4 (5 February 2014), 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/
09546553.2012.751912. 
25 Freeman, “A Theory of Terrorist Leadership (and Its Consequences for Leadership Targeting), 6. 
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munitions, and the vast amount of intelligence collection focused on disrupting terrorist 
leaders display prime examples of this strategy at work. Sometimes leadership targeting is 
effective at crippling terrorist organizations, and sometimes it is not; but it does apply 
constant pressure against terrorists and forces them to adopt new strategies to avoid detection 
and defeat. If executed incorrectly, this strategy only prolongs conflicts, since many terrorist 
groups are able to replace their removed or disrupted leadership, and continue their 
operations. 
Could contemporary and future terrorists began to embrace this leadership targeting 
approach in a slightly different manner? It would be over ambitious to believe a terrorist or 
terrorist group holds the constant capability to attempt to assassinate, kidnap, or harass a U.S. 
president; targets such as U.S. presidents are surrounded by vast physical security measures. 
However, if terrorists decide to take a surgical approach and adopt more selective targeting 
practices, their probability of operational success may rise and their chances of survivability 
remain intact. Rather than physically targeting a key leader, they may choose only to 
psychologically target them. Terrorists could target a valued aspect of a key leader’s life that 
is more vulnerable to exploitation without physically exerting force towards the key leader 
at all. By gaining control of a valued object in a key leader’s life, terrorist gain leverage. 
These objects of value may be loved ones, a lesser protected member of government, or the 
reputation and legitimacy of a key societal leader. If terrorists exercise leadership targeting 
in the future, they must understand three key components in their target selection process; 
the value of the adversarial key leader to the group or organization they represent, what is 
valuable to that key leader, and what are my [the terrorist’s] actual capabilities to influence 
or control that object of value. If these factors produce positive answers during a terrorist’s 
mission planning process, key leader targeting could be a viable terrorist option. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
Will terrorists and terrorist organizations use more personalized terrorism tactics
(PTT) against key leaders in the future? 
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D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SIGNIFICANCE
The reminder of this work is dedicated to displaying evidence that terrorist and
terrorists groups may choose to select more personalized tactical approaches in the future 
that target key leaders of influence. This thesis will leverage historical research and 
contemporary examples to support its predictions and conclusions. This study aims to raise 
awareness regarding the potential future threats of personalized terrorism tactics. 
This work highlights that terrorists’ tactics are forever changing in response to their 
adversary’s efforts to combat them. Evidence and recommendations outlined in the following 
four chapters display pragmatic reasons for terrorism’s tactical adaptations, and its current 
need to take on a more personalized approach to remain relevant and provide terrorists with 
any chance of future operational success. The strategic logic behind a growth and future 
probability of PTT presents itself in the following manner: 
1. The hardening of potential targets and the continued success of CT efforts 
since 2001 could spark terrorist adaptation to avoid detection and ultimate 
defeat. CT pressure may force terrorists to opt for PTT more. (Chapter II)
2. Advancements in technology and the power of mass media for both 
offensive and defensive terrorist tactics facilitates PTT. (Chapter III)
3. PTT were employed in the past, both successfully and unsuccessfully. If 
terrorists learn from their mistakes or remember their successes, will they 
attempt to use them again? (Chapter IV)
4. PTT has always existed and will not completely overshadow massive 
terrorist attacks in the future. It is important to recognize PTT’s potential for 
continued and greater use. Combating PTT requires situational awareness, 
key leader vulnerability analysis / protection, and organizational support.
(Chapter VI) 
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II. COUNTER-TERRORISM PROFICIENCY IN A POST–9/11 
WORLD 
Over the last 18 years, there is little doubt the U.S. has established itself as the 
global leader in all aspects of CT capabilities. The U.S. has a proven record of 
accomplishment in hunting down and eliminating terrorist leaders, disrupting terrorist 
operations, and destroying terrorist forces and resources in an expeditionary manner. The 
most recent notable examples being the U.S. military operations to retake Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled territory in the Middle East, and the targeted killing of ISIS 
leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi by U.S. special operations forces in 2019. The U.S. 
processes the ability to track and strike terrorists with unmanned drones, or deploy its 
highly trained special operations forces to raid terrorists’ safe havens. The U.S. benefits 
from a well-funded, highly trained, technologically advanced, and well-equipped CT 
apparatus with global reach. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. 
spent massive amounts of funding, labor, and legislation towards bolstering its abilities to 
detect, deter, and defeat terrorism.  
More than 260 U.S. government organizations were either created or 
reorganized following the 9/11 attacks, to focus on terrorism-related issues 
and to enhance information-sharing processes. Additionally, more than 130 
pieces of 9/11-related legislation were introduced in U.S. Congress, with 48 
bills and resolutions approved and signed into law.26 
The most notable legislative CT developments arose in the passing of the 2001 U.S. 
Patriot Act, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in 2002, and the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. All of these reforms enhanced 
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement capabilities, providing both entities with 
unprecedented authorities to conduct surveillance, investigate suspicious activity, and 
disrupt anything linked to terrorist activity. These reforms forced U.S. intelligence agencies 
to communicate with each other and share information like never before, leveraging each 
                                                 
26 Michael Kaczmarek et al., “US Counter-Terrorism Since 9/11: Trends Under The Trump 
Administration,” Briefing (European Parliament Liaison Office, Washington, DC, May 2018), 2–3 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/621898/EPRS_BRI(2018)621898_EN.pdf. 
16 
agency’s strengths and capabilities. Now U.S. domestic and international intelligence 
agencies shared a common purpose; find and disrupt terrorist activity inside the homeland 
and abroad. 
The U.S. judicial system also increased its abilities and proficiency to process cases 
involving terrorism. “Since 9/11, 439 people have been charged with jihadist terrorism or 
related crimes, or have died before being charged, but were widely reported to have 
engaged in jihadist criminal activity. In the past two years, the rise of ISIS has brought an 
unprecedented surge in terrorism cases.”27 These statistics only reflect linkages to Islamic 
terrorism. Hundreds of additional terrorist suspects have been apprehended, and tried as 
part of other terrorists groups, or as lone actors. Since the 9/11 attacks until December 
2019, the U.S. has prosecuted a total 906 suspects on charges related to terrorism activities, 
with only three suspects being fully acquitted and four having their charges completely 
dropped.28 Adding even more credibility to the U.S. justice system and the overall U.S. 
terrorism investigative process, 594 defendants have pled guilty to their charges and 197 
were found guilty in court.29 In the majority of these cases, violent acts of terrorism never 
had a chance to occur, and were most likely prevented by CT interdictions. This displays 
the proactive and preventative nature of post 9/11 U.S. CT efforts, and the fact that the 
majority of the total convictions (469) were for individuals providing indirect material 
support to terrorist groups or activities, rather than executing actual terrorist attacks.30 
These numbers attest to the strength of U.S. CT forces and agencies, and their 
abilities to build a concrete case against those suspected of terrorism activities. The growth 
of terrorism cases within the U.S. judicial is understandable, considering U.S. law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies are now, more than they were before 9/11, actively 
                                                 
 27 Peter Bergen et al., “Part I. Terrorism Cases: 2001-Today,” New America, Constantly Updated 
Database, https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-in-america/part-i-overview-terrorism-cases-
2001-today/. 
28 L.J. Ruell et al., “Trial and Terror,” The Intercept, October 30, 2019, https://trial-and-
terror.theintercept.com/. 
29 Ruell et al., “Trial and Terror.” 
30 Ruell et al., “Trial and Terror.” 
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hunting for suspects. Additionally, these increased terrorism related arrests and lethal CT 
operations have resulted in the disruption or complete foiling of terror plots. 
A. CT FOILS TERRORISM PLOTS 
In 2007, The Heritage Foundation became the first and only organization to 
track thwarted terrorist attacks against the United States. That year, Heritage 
reported that at least 19 publicly known terrorist attacks against the United 
States had been foiled since 9/11. Today [2012] that number stands at 50. 
The fact that the United States has not suffered a large-scale attack since 9/
11 speaks to the country’s counterterrorism successes.31 
CT operations and processes, shrouded in secrecy for obvious operational security, 
do not receive heavy public attention. Often the foiling of terrorists plots and successful 
interdictions remain unknown. “President Kennedy famously said of the CIA that its 
successes will be secret and its failures will be trumpeted. In the intelligence business 
success is transitory and failure is permanent.”32 Numbers and estimates of foiled terrorist 
plots vary because of the numerous categories in which acts of terrorism are divided into, 
and the lack of publicly accessible information contributes to this analytical confusion and 
diversity.33 One conclusion does present itself, in that CT operations and efforts in the post 
9/11 era, have drastically increased and resulted in an increase in terrorist plot prevention 
(see Figure 2). Effective CT measures and security procedures in a post 9/11 world reduces 
terrorism threats against the masses. 
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From 1995- 2001, only 31.9% of plots were foiled. Following the 9/11 attacks, from 2002 
through 2012, 80.6% of plots were thwarted prior to reaching execution. On average, the 
percent of plots reaching execution declined by 3.42 percentage points per year. 
Figure 2. Foiled and Executed Terrorists Plots (Against the U.S. 
1995–2012) 34 
The U.S. Department of Defense and all branches of the U.S. military naturally 
embraced their newfound responsibility of becoming the entity to exert military force 
against terrorist threats abroad. In the years to follow, over 2.5 million35 (as of 2016) U.S. 
service men and women would deploy to Iraq and Afghanistan. This number is still 
growing today with active military operations in both regions and elsewhere. U.S. special 
operations units such as the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and U.S. Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) have produced some of the most substantial blows to 
terrorists and their networks. All branches of the U.S. military have impressive tactical and 
operational records against terrorists, but most notably units such as JSOC and USSOCOM 
have perfected the art of hunting terrorists and dismantling terrorist networks. These two 
organizations are comprised of America’s most skilled military units, who for the past 18 
years have yielded enormous effects not only in the areas of declared armed conflict (ex. 
Iraq and Afghanistan) but in other lesser publicized regions terrorists use as sanctuaries. 
                                                 
34 Source: Kevin J. Strom, John S. Hollywood, and Mark Pope, “Terrorist Plots Against the United 
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RAND Corporation, 2016), 8–9, https://www.rand.org/pubs/working_papers/WR1113.html. 
35 Erik W. Goepner, “Measuring the Effectiveness of America’s War on Terror,” Parameters, 46, no. 
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19 
President Bush made it abundantly clear on the night of September 11, 2001, that the 
U.S. “will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts [9/11] and 
those who harbor them.”36 The U.S. battle against international terrorism has extreme 
reach; to the deserts of sub Saharan Africa, to the jungles of the Philippines, to 
drone strike operations in the Northwest Frontier Provinces of Pakistan; U.S. special 
operations forces conducting CT operations experience little to no limitations. JSOC and 
USSOCOM along with the targeting provided by a robust U.S. intelligence 
community, continue to hunt, capture and kill terrorists globally today. The process 
is effectively streamlined and unilateral. These efforts place constant pressure on 
terrorist networks and appear to reduce terrorist’s threats towards the masses.  
This rejuvenation of U.S. military force projection abroad, and specifically in the 
name of CT, has made life very difficult, but not impossible for terrorists, both foreign and 
domestic. It has become far more difficult to attack the masses through terror attacks due 
to successful CT efforts. However, terrorists continue to adapt to the pressures both U.S. 
and international CT efforts apply to them on a tactical level, and select paths of least 
resistance in an effort to project their strategic messages. It may be easier now, more than 
ever, to protect the masses, leaving individual key leader vulnerabilities more exposed. 
B. THE PARADOX OF TARGET HARDENING
Terrorists prefer “softer targets” that are easier to gain access to and effect, versus
taking unnecessary operational risks against more secure or “hardened targets.” “Soft 
targets are easy targets, so terrorists are dedicated to continue attacking these vulnerable 
entities. While soft targets have typically included hospitals, restaurants, nightclubs, super 
markets, schools, sports venues, churches, malls, and areas where large numbers of people 
gather.”37 These targets could also include susceptible individuals. 
36 President George W. Bush, “9/11 Address to the Nation,” American Rhetoric (11 September 2001), 
https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbush911addresstothenation.htm.  
37 Richard H. Martin, “Soft Targets Are Easy Terror Targets: Increased Frequency of Attacks, 
Practical Preparation, and Prevention,” Forensic Research & Criminology International Journal, 3, no. 2 
(21 November 2016), 273–278, https://medcraveonline.com/FRCIJ/FRCIJ-03-00087.pdf. 
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Has international CT success given rise to these types of soft target attacks?38 The 
business of physical target hardening presents a vicious cycle and overall paradox. Much 
like squeezing the “terrorist balloon” during expeditionary and kinetic CT operations, 
defensively hardening one potential target may push terrorists to another. For example, 
after 9/11, U.S. embassies drastically increased their physical security measures, making 
their compounds less appealing to terrorist attack. “Where embassies might once have 
made attractive options, assailants now tend to attack hotels near embassies.”39 Target 
hardening of physical locations designed to protect populations creates a potential terrorist 
response and tactical change to more individualized targets. 
There is little argument against the effectiveness of physical security measures and 
barriers at deterring physical violence or attacks. Physical barriers tend to work against 
physical threats. An examination of the effectiveness of the Los Angeles County Police 
Department’s execution of Operation Cul-de-Sac in 1989 to deter gang violence, to the 
barriers that still stand today in the neighborhoods of Belfast, Northern Ireland and within 
Israel, prove the benefits of stopping physical violence via fortifications and target 
hardening.40 However, PTT reinforced through limited physical actions, projected via 
bodiless ideas, messages, and emotional fears can negate these physical protections. 
Physical barriers may not be capable of containing or protecting against these 
psychological influences and pressures from afar. 
The effective CT practice of hardening physical infrastructure intends to protect the 
masses from the effects of terrorism, and may overlook the personalized vulnerabilities of 
individuals. CT entities today are best suited to discover and interdict large-scale terrorist 
attacks, rather than shielding the emotions and vulnerabilities of numerous individual 
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societal leaders. Physical target hardening of locations is natural response terrorism, and it 
may reduce large-scale and indiscriminate terror attacks against populations. However, 
target hardening could push terrorism activities and tactics elsewhere and possibly to more 
individualized targets of opportunity. 
C. WHY CT PROFICIENCY AND TARGET HARDENING COULD FORCE 
TERRORISTS TO CHANGE THEIR TACTICS 
Terrorists continuously learn from failure, and exhibit the ability to learn from their 
past mistakes. If a terrorist’s ideology or their cause remains intact, so does their ability to 
adapt to adversity in their pursuit to gain desired objectives. Terrorists commonly use 
regions experiencing armed conflict as “learning laboratories;” testing their tactics, 
techniques and procedures for future use.41 Following the tactical defeats groups like ISIS 
and Al-Qaeda, have absorbed in recent years placed little to no decrease on their groups’ 
strategic visions and tactical adaptations. They continue to share terrorism tactics across 
the internet, spread terrorist propaganda for recruitment, and disseminate instructions on 
future courses of action to take to survive. Their ideology and desire to conduct acts of 
terrorism remains strong despite the substantial tactical and operational victories CT forces 
have enjoyed. Al-Qaeda, now poised to enter into its fourth decade of existence, benefits 
from its ability to pass information and successful tactics, techniques, and procedures on 
to the next generation.42 Faced with the overwhelming threat of CT forces’ ability to 
conduct surveillance, aerial detection of their activities, followed by subsequent kinetic 
strikes and raids; terrorists find themselves at a distinct disadvantage and are in constant 
search for solutions. If the masses are harder to influence or effect through terror, then 
targeting key individuals in influential positions of power could be what terrorists turn to 
more often in the future. 
Terrorists have always adapted and evolved in the face of adversity. “For a terrorist 
or terrorist group to survive and grow stronger, it must adjust its methods to thwart 
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countermeasures and seek to preserve its capabilities.”43 Unfortunately, attacks against the 
masses will never completely end. Violence against the public will remain an ingredient to 
international terrorism, no matter how difficult the challenge to do so exists. However, 
pragmatic terrorists who understand the current difficulties facing their operations, 
honestly wish to avoid continuous defeat, and conduct a cost-benefit analysis of their 
actions rather than allowing their ideologies to blind them, may choose to shift their target 
focus to key individuals. Terrorists have shown solely in their abilities to outlast CT’s 
tactical and operational efforts alone for years that their means and tactics are indeed 
calculated, and change due to forceful stimuli within their operational environments. In the 
face of adversity presented by modern CT responses to terrorism, terrorizing societal key 
leaders may prove more effective, less costly, and easier for a pragmatic terrorist. 
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III. ENABLING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE POWER OF MEDIA 
The growth of the information age, the availability of new technological 
advancements, and the power of mass media, all enable the employment of PTT and give 
concern towards its potential rise. “The weapons of terrorism are no longer exclusively 
guns and bombs; the modern terrorist’s arsenal now includes laptop and desktop 
computers, CD burners and e-mail accounts, and the Internet and the World Wide Web.”44 
Terrorist naturally operate from a constant position of disadvantage. “Offsetting this 
disadvantage requires them to carry out terrorist ‘spectaculars,’ which command the 
attention of the media and, through the magnification effect of media exposure, generate a 
political impact that is greater than the investment required to carry out the attacks in the 
first place.”45 The internet and new technologies provide a terrorist or terrorist organization 
with anonymity, operational security, and physical standoff that they would not benefit 
from otherwise. All of these aspects promote a terrorist’s physical survival or the survival 
of their cause. The media then facilitates and illuminates PTT, not by seeking to influence 
the masses directly, but instead uses the masses to influence an individual target. The media 
allows immense societal pressures to reach and influence a key leader, and may force them 
to capitulate to a terrorism demands in an effort to retain their position of power or 
reputation. These technological capabilities and enabling qualities prove especially useful 
in the employment of PTT and in a terrorist’s efforts to influence a key leader from afar. 
Technology and the media provide natural insulation and standoff for a terrorist. 
Modern technology and the media enable a terrorist action against a key leader to 
broadcast out for the masses to not only witness, but to form influential options about. 
Instead of the masses being in danger, the key leader is the only entity under stress or threat, 
and everyone can watch as the situation develops. To achieve their desired objective, 
terrorists are constantly searching for, “a technical and tactical edge that will allow them 
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to create the theatrical kind of event they want.”46 Emerging technologies and the help of 
mass media assist terrorist in these efforts. Even though a target of PTT remains singular 
and specifically selected, the effects of these types of tactics inflicted upon a key target are 
widespread and reverberate due to the position the targeted individual maintains in their 
society. This bonus effect can exacerbate the tense situation facing the target, succeed in 
delegitimizing the targeted individual, and anyone with an internet connection and motive 
now possesses the power to do it.  
“Part of living in the digital era is understanding that our private information is 
more vulnerable than ever before.”47 The targeting, manipulation, and exploitation of 
personal information creates provoking emotional responses, and can result in debilitating 
personalized effects. Exploitive data is readily available to terrorists. Data found online 
and on multiple personal devices, or obtained via invasive digital hacking provides 
terrorists with information to leverage. Additionally, should the masses become aware 
through various forms of media, of a personalized data breach effecting one of their key 
leaders, their opinions and influence on the matter become a critical factor. In regards to 
PTT, technology provides for the cultivation of personalized information, media then 
broadcasts that information. The public is then used as a terrorist’s tool of influence rather 
than a target of influence. Control of information, an especially personal information not 
intended for public consumption, equals power. “Information now holds the power to 
disorganize governance, delude adversaries, and reduce an opponent’s will to resist.”48 
Societal pressures undoubtedly play into the targeted individual’s decision-making process 
when confronted with PTT, displaying the power of information. Informational influence 
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has, “reached such perfection that it can tackle strategic tasks.”49 Terrorists now hold the 
ability to obtain and weaponize the personal information of a key leader. 
A. TECHNOLOGIES AND TACTICS AVAILABLE 
Wide varieties of technological and digital tactics are available to terrorists in 
today’s information age. Designed to simplify and increase the efficiency of 
communication and execute human daily interactions, these technologies are susceptible 
to terrorist abuse and exploitation. In the case of PTT employment, individual 
psychological effects could be far easier to obtain. Without diving into the numerous 
intricacies regarding specific digital software or various operating systems, we will discuss 
two technological developments and the tactical advantages they could potentially provide 
to terrorists. Both developments and tactics display the increased weaponization of 
personal information, and that the individualization of modern conflict is quickly becoming 
a reality.50 
1. Hacking and Sextortion 
The first technological development and the generalized tactic of digital hacking, 
provides a hacker with the ability to hold reputations at ransom. Hackers invasively gain 
access to a targeted individual’s personal information for some form of exploitation. Often 
invasive physical or cyber hacking is not necessary, and a targeted individual’s personal 
information or digital activities may be readily available off social media platforms or open 
for public consumption on the World Wide Web. “Blackmailing victims using their sexual 
activity as leverage is a crime as old as time, but this form of sextortion is a uniquely 
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modern phenomenon insofar as it relies of the use of modern technology in the acquisition 
of material and the threat of dissemination.”51 
Once a hacker obtains damaging information or access to an individual or a group 
of individuals, their next steps could take numerous forms. They may seek to extort the 
captured information for monetary profit, blackmail the target to gain desired objectives or 
demands; or only aim to delegitimize, embarrass or harass the target while threating to 
share their information publicly. This is especially devastating to individuals in the public 
eye, or key leaders, who value their reputations greatly because of their positions within 
society, and the influence public opinion has as their source of status. These aspects of a 
key individual’s life are indirect and periphery in nature, but still valuable to a terrorist and 
hacker nonetheless. An example of a popular form of digital hacking that could affect 
anyone, but could be especially crippling to a key personality, is the tactic of “sextortion.” 
Sextortion is the practice of someone hacking into a targeted individual’s computer or 
mobile device, and then accessing the camera system or data on that device to actively spy 
on them, or record them engaging in embarrassing sexual behaviors.52 What used to be an 
aspect of people’s private and personal lives is now violated, and available to a hacker to 
exploit. Often the “sextortionist” sends an email to their target to inform them that they 
now possess this embarrassing information about them adding credibility to the situation 
with distinct details of the information they now possess. They may then demand money 
sent to them in return for not sharing this gained information with a victim’s family, friends, 
or the public at large. Hackers often promote the use of more secure and anonymous 
cryptocurrency platforms during the transfer of digital funds from a victim.53  
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Although categorized as obvious criminal activity, cyber sextortion is a feasible 
tactic for terrorists to employ. In either of its previously stated forms, intense (real or 
perceived) personalized pressures are applied against an individual target. Recently, this 
tactic of sextortion has been used in a “spray and pray attack” style, targeting millions of 
email accounts and devices in a mass attempt to gain money from its many victims.54 The 
use of botnets and other programs enable hackers to cast a wide net, and collect large 
amounts of embarrassing data, in the hopes of gaining limited successful returns. However, 
notable cases effecting public figures do exist, but kept confidential. Amazon CEO and 
Washington Post owner Jeff Bezos may be the most notable case.55 Imagine if the 
nefarious actors behind Jeff Bezos’ situation were more effective in their operational 
execution, and able to manipulate the owner of the most powerful E-commerce platform 
to date, and a national level media outlet. 
It is not impossible to imagine lone actor terrorists or terrorist groups with political 
motivations, utilizing sextortion tactics simply to fund their operations,56 or worse, 
influencing a specific target for a prolonged period. A high profile victim of sextortion may 
be too embarrassed or vulnerable to combat the threat. The PTT used against them may be 
too effective for them to resist capitulating to demands made. They may opt to capitulate 
to their harasser’s demands, change existing policies, disrupt economic markets, or 
continue to make a string of decisions in favor of their oppressors. They could effectively 
become a “terrorist’s puppet.” Only a few U.S. states have addressed the issue of sextortion 
and made it illegal within their own borders, while the U.S. federal government still does 
not constitute sextortion as an official crime.57 Foreign or domestic terrorists could 
potentially take advantage of these existing legal gaps, and use sextortion tactics against 
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targeted individuals for political gain, or destabilize the current economic and political 
order. 
2. Artificial Intelligence 
The second technological development concerns the growth and spread of artificial 
intelligence (AI) capabilities. Essentially AI “refers to the simulation of human intelligence 
in machines that are programmed to think like humans and mimic their actions. The term 
may also be applied to any machine that exhibits traits associated with a human mind such 
as learning and problem-solving.”58 Regarded most commonly as an enhancement tool for 
CT targeting and surveillance efforts; AI technology could also provide advantages for 
terrorists and the projection of PTT. AI holds the ability to manipulate environments and 
mask reality if programed to do so. In an effort to delegitimize a key leader, terrorists could 
use AI software and technologies to impersonate and embarrass these key leaders digitally 
(public addresses), confusing and potentially influencing the public and the key leader’s 
base of power in the process. 
Non-lethal AI technologies possess the power to influence, manipulate, and fool 
target audiences. Comedian Jordan Peele demonstrated this deception when he digitally 
impersonated President Barack Obama in an AI generated video.59 Peele sat in front of a 
camera and spoke, while a computer recorded his speech, and then converted it to a realistic 
depiction of President Obama saying exactly what Peele was saying in real-time. The AI 
system programed to apply specific Obama mannerisms and physical traits, produced a 
very realistic video of what looks like the actual President of the United States delivering 
a formal address. The AI system learned how to mimic President Obama through previous 
data collection and inputs from its programmers. The digitally fabricated president would 
say anything and do anything Peele did. “While by no means perfect, the expectation is 
that sooner rather than later, this technology will get to a point where it is indistinguishable 
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from what the subject is really saying. Other technologies in development not only allow 
someone to imitate a mouth moving, but the voice itself.”60 
Jordan Peele’s skit serves as a warning that technology now provides almost anyone 
with the ability to bend the truth, and project desired messages to a global audience. In 
regions of the world with singular and limited forms of communication connectivity or 
internet access, this form of technological terrorism could be devastatingly effective just 
based on the scarcity of other means of information. With their hands on this type of 
manipulative technology, terrorists could influence not only populations, but also fabricate 
singular messages between national leaders and other key societal figures. Along with the 
assistance of social media and mass media, these fabricated videos and audio clips can 
spread rapidly, again providing terrorist with the initiative. Having this AI capability and 
the instrumental power it provides, provides terrorist entities with the ability to partake in 
international and political affairs. By impersonating or embarrassing targeted key leaders, 
terrorist now possess the means to make their fictions a reality. 
B. THE REALITY OF FICTION 
Popular entertainment media often displays how easy terrorism and especially how 
PTT are executed with the assistance of modern technology. These types of shows, films, 
and media seek to entertain and inform, but in doing so perpetuate the fear of these events 
actually happening. They can also romanticize the idea concept of personalize terrorism 
for potential terrorists. Just as mass media coverage of real world terrorist events produces 
a symbiotic relationship of viewers for the media and attention for a terrorist’s cause,61 
fictional terrorism plots provided by Hollywood may spread understanding and new fears 
of terrorist tactics. 
Propelling the reality of Hollywood style plotlines coming to life is the current 
realization that technology once thought to be futuristic and impossible, is now readily 
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available. Facial recognition software, “speak-writing,” floating fortresses [naval carrier 
strike groups], artificial intelligence technology, and mass surveillance systems were all 
included in George Orwell’s famous fictional novel, 1984; and all of these predictions have 
come to fruition in various forms.62 The two following case studies of the popular TV 
series The West Wing and Black Mirror, seek to illuminate the current plausibility and 
possibilities for the employment of PTT in today’s world. Although many cinematic 
productions are relatable to the effective applications of PTT, these two TV shows and 
some of their specific episodes provide excellent examples. 
1. Fictional Case Study #1: Black Mirror 
The first episode of Black Mirror titled, “The National Anthem”63 takes place in 
present day London, and more specifically focuses on the office of the British Prime 
Minister (PM). The episode starts with the PM and his staff learning the news that the 
British Royal Princess, Susannah, has been kidnapped and taken hostage. Princess 
Susannah is internationally adored and the British public is shocked to learn of the 
kidnapping. They learn of the situation in the same manner as British government; via an 
online video uploaded to YouTube from an encrypted IP address. The video shows a 
frightened and restrained Princess Susannah, reading off an unprecedented demand during 
the hostage video. In order for the British government to guarantee the safe return of the 
Princess, the terrorist(s) demand that the PM have sexual intercourse with a pig, and the 
act be broadcasted live on national TV that very afternoon. If the PM fails to meet these 
demands, the British government attempts any sort of CT interdiction, or the requested act 
be fabricated in any way; the Princess will be executed. 
As the day progresses, conventional news networks begin to cover the story. Social 
media attention continues to climb with upwards of 18 million views of the ransom video 
and 10,000 tweets on average produced on the topic every minute. The British public 
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becomes intimately involved in the situation, constantly sharing their opinions on whether 
or not the PM should conduct the indecent sex act to save their Princess’ life. As the 
deadline for the ransom demands approaches, the PM’s personal anxiety increases. The 
popular opinions of the British and now international public begin to weigh on his decision- 
making. How he and his staff deal with this issue will be a large part of his future political 
career, reputation, and personal relationships. On a personal level, the PM’s wife is gravely 
concerned that her husband will in fact have to conduct the requested act, also bringing her 
direct embarrassment, and soiling their marriage. Her understandably emotional state 
increases the PM’s stress level even more. He assures her that, “It will not come to that…” 
but his assurances are weak at best as time ticks away. To make matters worse, the PM 
receives a direct call from the Queen herself. The Queen tells him, “I’m sure YOU will do 
everything in your power to get the Princess back.” This added pressure from the royal 
monarch makes the matter even more personalized and isolating for the PM. 
In the end, the British PM succumbs to the overwhelming pressure facing him and 
does have sexual intercourse with a pig on live television. The streets of London are empty 
with millions huddled around televisions to watch the event unfold. An estimated 1.3 
billion people tune in globally to watch the act as well. The British government discovers 
that one lone and deranged terrorist was behind the events, and effectively delegitimized 
the political leader of a nation in under 24 hours with the help of technology, the media, 
and personalized tactics. 
2. How Is This an Example of PTT? 
It takes little explanation to understand that this terrorist’s actions in this episode of 
Black Mirror were directly targeting the British Prime Minister, and executed in a hyper-
personalized manner. This terrorist did not express any particular political objectives, but 
he did succeed in harassing, embarrassing, and delegitimizing a key leader within the 
British government. Imagine if his demands included certain policy changes or political 
concessions on the part of the British government. The value of Princess Susannah to the 
masses, the monarchy, and the PM were so great; that it generated a distinct possibility that 
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any demand within the immediate influence of the British government would be considered 
or met. 
This terrorist selected a national level leader to disgrace and delegitimize in front 
of an unlimited audience, by gaining advantages through the abduction of an object of 
personal value. Princess Susannah, like many societal figureheads, processes no direct 
political authority within the current British government. She is only a young woman with 
a royal title, who may one day be Queen. However, she is still a beloved and iconic member 
of society, and her well-being is valued above others. The instrumental power of PTT are 
once again shown by the lack of kinship between the PM and the Princess. The Princess 
was not his own daughter. Although not emotionally connected to the Princess through 
familial bonds, the PM was pressured into regarding her as a personal object of value, 
because his objects of value suddenly involved her well-being. Whether this terrorist’s 
actions were politically motivated or not, they proved an individual’s ability to dismantle 
central governance with the help of technology. If political demands rather than the 
production of an embarrassing video were what this terrorist requested, and the PM and 
government made concessions, far more damage than just the PM’s personal life could 
have resulted. 
3. Fictional Case Study #2: The West Wing 
Three episodes of The West Wing, stretching between its fourth and fifth seasons 
addressed a prime example of PTT against a national leader. During the final episode of 
season four named, “Twenty Five,” President Bartlet’s youngest daughter Zoey is 
kidnapped by terrorists.64 The terrorists make two political ransom demands, to the 
president. They want the removal of U.S. military forces from the Middle East (the fictional 
nation of Qumar) and the release of their terrorists comrades presently detained. Overcome 
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by the lack of control of the situation and faced with bringing the nation to the brink of 
war, President Bartlet confides in his chief of staff, saying that the situation at hand is too 
much for him to handle as both a father, and the President of the United States. He fears he 
does not have clarity of mind and may act impulsively due to the circumstances facing 
himself and his family. In an act of selflessness, Bartlet decides to enact the twenty-fifth 
amendment; temporarily relieving himself from office until the situation arrives at a 
conclusion. 
U.S. CT analysts finally receive information regarding the possible whereabouts of 
Zoey Bartlet. CT forces proceed to raid the suspected location, killing multiple terrorists 
and rescuing an only slightly injured Zoey. The situation concludes with President Bartlet 
resuming the office of the presidency. 
4. How Is This an Example of PTT? 
Once again, this dramatic and fictional terrorism situation, depicted in a TV show, 
attempted to inflict pressure upon an influential individual in control of the most powerful 
nation in the world. Terrorists decided to attack a valuable and softer target of opportunity, 
but one of great value to an acting U.S. president. By gaining a position of leverage through 
the successful kidnapping of the president’s daughter, the terrorists in this case were then 
able to make demands from a position of strength they did not previously enjoy. Zoey 
Bartlet, much like Princess Susannah in the episode of Black Mirror, possessed zero 
political power. However, her safety is of the utmost importance to someone who does 
yield the ability to change policy, negotiate, and grant desired objectives to terrorist 
entities. This makes her an excellent personalized target of terrorism. Surprisingly, 
President Bartlet recognized early this conflict of interest, and did not allow hubris or 
impulsiveness to overcome his own or the greater national decision-making process. He 
smartly removed himself from the personalized nature of the terrorist situation realizing 
the stress he was under, and handing over the crisis to someone not personally effected by 
the matter. Luckily, Bartlet’s strategy worked, and his actions served as a prime example 
of what to do if confronted with PTT as a key individual. 
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C. WHY TECHNOLOGY AND MEDIA COULD ENABLE A RISE IN PTT 
These two fictional episodes prove entertaining, but also exhibit a clear warning of 
the effectiveness of PTT when projected against key leaders rather than the masses. Both 
show the power and capabilities current technologies, media, and personalized targeting 
effects key leaders. An isolated target like the British PM in Black Mirror received little 
support from his own staff and government to reduce the amount of personalized pressure 
he was exposed to. Adversely, President Bartlet in The West Wing received insulation and 
support (mainly due to his own recognition of the stress he was experiencing, but also from 
the organizational support structures defined in the U.S. constitution). In these two cases, 
terrorists were able to temporary disrupt governments, expose critical vulnerabilities, and 
harass key leaders to gain public attention for their purposes. Kidnapping for some kind of 
ransom or demand was a common denominator in both of these scenarios. In the case of 
Black Mirror, it proved successful and could have been more impactful if specific political 
demands were made. While the episode of The West Wing, displayed the effectiveness of 
focused CT efforts and humble leadership. The tactic of terrorists kidnapping will show up 
once again in following historical examples, most notably because it creates such a 
powerful advantage for terrorists struggling to even the proverbial playing field against 
well-established state adversaries and leaders. PTT in both of these cases provided 
terrorists entities with temporary advantages over their adversaries.  
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IV. A HISTORICAL BLUEPRINT FOR PTT 
Referencing historical examples of the effective employment of PTT provides 
additional strategic rationale for their likely use in the future. If certain IP tactics succeeded 
in the past, they very well may work again. PTT targeting key leaders traces its origins back 
to ancient times. The assassinations of key leaders in ancient Rome removed Tiberius 
Gracchus in 133 BCE, his brother Gaius in 121 BCE and most notably ended the reign of 
Julius Caesar.65 “Decisions in the Roman Senate and other assemblies reached the point that 
intimidation was responsible for the votes that were cast...Roman leaders were key 
targets.”66 The European anarchist movements of the 19th century also displayed a love for 
PTT; targeting a German Kaiser, Kings of Spain and Italy, and killing Tsar Alexander II in 
the hopes of influencing desired political changes.67 
In these following examples, methods such as kidnapping and coercion are rampant. 
The IP tactics discussed in these following examples display both successful and 
unsuccessful applications, and all hinged upon the correct selection of various targets and 
tactics. Whether or not these previous terrorist operations worked or failed is irrelevant in 
this historical sense. The fact remains that they were attempted, and utilized personalized 
tactics to reach their goals. Terrorists can potentially use both the good and the bad lessons 
from these examples to modify their future approaches for their own situations. The 
following examples also represent a mix of both kinetic and non-kinetic tactics. However, 
all these cases share the commonalities of a terrorist or terrorist group trying to incite fear in 
an individualized target of influence by direct means. 
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A. THE RIGHT TACTICS AND RIGHT TARGET: THE DUARTE 
KIDNAPPING 
The first lesson one learns about kidnappings is that the family goes through 
unbearable emotion...The emotional strain hinders any calm, clear analysis of 
what has to be done to resolve the kidnapping. 
 —President of El Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte68 
From October 1979 to January 1992, a bloody civil war ravaged the small Central 
American country of El Salvador. Locked in a stalemate for almost 12 years, the government 
of El Salvador battled the insurrection of leftist rebels from the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN). Though backed by U.S. financial and military support, the El 
Salvadorian government struggled to contain or defeat the irregular guerrilla and terrorist 
threats the FMLN presented. José Napoleón Duarte served as president of El Salvador from 
June 1984—June 1989 in the middle of the national crisis. On September 10, 1985, President 
Duarte would learn that armed FMLN gunmen had kidnapped his oldest daughter Ines 
Guadalupe Duarte and her friend Ana Cecilia Villeda. During the violent assault and 
subsequent abduction, two bodyguards assigned to protect the 35-year-old Ines were shot 
and killed.69 Ines and Ana would remain in FMLN captivity for 44 days, until Duarte and 
his government negotiated with the FMLN terrorists for their release.70 In exchange for the 
safe return of Ines, Ana, and the release of 23—25 pro-government mayors, the government 
would release 22 political prisoners and 96 wounded FMLN guerrilla fighters.71 Though 
suspenseful, the exchange went smoothly and the Duarte family reunited with their daughter.  
Following the exchange, the FMLN capitalized on the opportunity to use the 
exchange to their informational benefit. They quickly publicized photos of the president’s 
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daughter fraternizing with her captors and propaganda suggesting the government was now 
expressing sympathy for the rebel’s cause by accommodating their demands.72 The 
negotiations between Duarte’s inner circle and FMLN were highly criticized by senior El 
Salvadorian officials, one of whom stated that, ‘‘There is no question that the government 
loses in this negotiation.’’73 Extreme conservative critics of Duarte’s settlement with the 
FMLN believed he should have displayed unwavering stubbornness and refused to negotiate 
with the terrorists at all; treating his daughter as a piece of collateral damage in the conflict, 
much like the story of Jose Moscardo Ituarte and his captured son during the Spanish civil 
war of the late 1930s.74 Those critical of the exchange would argue that the personal grief 
and pressure placed upon President Durante by the kidnapping of his daughter would cloud 
his decision-making, and actually stymie concurrent Salvadorian CT and counter insurgency 
operations (COIN). The kidnapping disrupted and disoriented Salvadorian military 
operations, “resulting in the rebels launching their largest military attack of the year, killing 
42 Salvadorian military recruits and wounding about 72 others at the army’s main training 
school during the period of negotiations.”75 
The whole episode has been not only a personal trial for Mr. Duarte but also 
a political test, with a number of senior military officers questioning whether 
he should have negotiated with the guerrillas. Some officers told reporters 
they deplored the virtual halt of Government anti-guerrilla operations in the 
areas where rebels are most active and where the President’s daughter might 
have been held.76 
Duarte would later defend his actions during the ordeal, giving credit to his decision 
to detach himself from the situation and form a committee designed to advise him through 
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the crisis.77 Duarte refused to believe that the negotiated settlement had any adverse effects 
on the outcomes or events of the civil war, or was in unbalanced favor of the FMLN’s 
interest. Instead, Duarte contests that, “not since the Greeks set out for Troy had so much 
been asked of an army for the sake of one women. As much as I loved my daughter, I would 
never hand El Salvador over to the guerrilla forces.”78 Duarte only assumed the situation 
would result in negative political consequences for himself, and was evidently willing to 
accept those risks. 
Only a year following the incident, and still in the midst of leading his nation through 
a civil war, Duarte explains the tremendous anxiety he felt during his daughter’s captivity in 
his autobiography, Duarte: My Story. He identifies the frustration and fear he faced during 
his daughter’s captivity, provided by the PTT used by the FMLN. The FMLN was employing 
an effective campaign of personalized coercion. Duarte describes the personalized nature of 
the ordeal by saying, “it is hard to understand that human beings can be like wolves, preying 
off one another. Even worse, they attack an innocent woman, not me. They want to use our 
love for our children to wound us.”79 Three months after the exchange, the New York Times 
would report that the ordeal had left lasting emotional scars and trauma upon the Duarte 
family, emphasizing that, “Mr. Duarte’s actions during his daughter’s captivity at times 
seemed erratic to many observers.”80  
According to close aides, Duarte became bitter that the rebels kidnapped his 
daughter after he took the political risk of trying to talk peace with them. The 
seeming optimism with which the Salvadoran leader originally offered to 
negotiate and broker a diplomatic solution diminished.81 
Duarte’s new narrow-minded and emotionally driven approach to both CT and COIN 
strategy against the FMLN following the kidnapping of his daughter would continue to 
protract the conflict. 
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In this historic example of PTT, the FMLN acquired a target of personal value to a 
key national leader, all in an effort to pressure that key leader to commit behavioral changes 
and shift policy in their favor. The FMLN regained over a hundred captured members that 
could once again be beneficial to their cause, in exchange for only two women and a handful 
of local mayors. Most importantly, the FLMN gained legitimacy by delegitimizing their state 
adversary, and its head of state. They ultimately won the struggle for information in this 
round of the conflict. The FMLN used this high profile kidnapping to successfully promote 
and message their cause. By personally harassing the president of El Salvador for 44 days, 
they displayed their ability to disrupt central governance and proved to the population that 
their government was incapable of providing adequate security. If Salvadorian security 
forces could not even protect the president’s daughter, what else could they not do? By 
leveraging the power and credibility of previous violent kinetic acts, the FMLN’s threats of 
hurting Duarte’s captured daughter were perceived as a reality to President Duarte. The 
FMLN took advantage of a destabilized and distracted Salvadorian government, smartly 
choosing to pressure a vulnerable leader of a war torn country to not only capitulate to their 
demands in the end, but to treat them as equals at the negotiating table. 
B. EUROPEAN TERRORISM OF THE 1970s: MARXIST GROUPS AND 
FIGHTING FOR INDEPENDENCE 
Numerous nations throughout Europe in the 1970s struggled with the threat of 
terrorism. The decade marked the peak of terrorist activity Western Europe.82 A distinct 
wave of communist ideology fueled many groups like the Red Army Faction (RAF) mainly 
operating in Germany and France, and the similar leftist Red Brigades in Italy to execute 
terrorist attacks during their struggles against conservative state opponents. Other groups like 
IRA rose to prominence in their struggle for independence and the unification of Ireland, 
targeting British forces and loyalists in Northern Ireland and even projecting some of their 
most spectacular attacks into England itself. They conducted bombings, assassinations, and 
other kinetic acts of terror against their adversaries. They displayed a keen appreciation for 
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the employment of PTT that targeted influential leaders. Their employment of PTT was not 
always successful, but it was a popular tactic of choice. These groups often channeled their 
violence towards targets that they hoped would create a desired emotional rise or response 
from whomever they were trying to influence. These following brief examples of European 
terrorist acts of the 1970s display both the operational shortcomings of poorly chosen targets 
and tactics.  
1. Right Tactics and Wrong Targets: Moro and Schleyer 
Known for their brutality, the RAF based in East Germany and Red Brigades of Italy 
both understood the value in kidnapping high value individuals to use as bargaining chips. 
Leftist groups such as the RAF normally favored attacking individuals rather than the general 
public.83 Both the RAF and Red Brigades found themselves constantly suppressed and 
hunted by state security forces. Any slight position of advantage gained could prove useful 
in achieving strategic and long-term political goals, or merely smaller tactical level victories 
involving the state capitulating to specific ransom demands that could promote their 
revolutionary struggle. The governments of Germany and Italy tried to maintain a strict no-
negotiation policy with the terrorist groups operating within their borders, fearing the 
slightest leniency towards them would lead to a slippery slope of continued appeasement. 
This policy may have proved effective in limiting the immediate effects of terrorism against 
the state, but would equal disastrous personal consequences for both Aldo Moro and Hans 
Martin Schleyer, and present lasting controversy. 
On September 5, 1977 the RAF executed a well-planned and deadly kidnapping 
operation against prominent German industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer on the streets of 
Cologne, West Germany. Heavily armed RAF gunman ambushed Schleyer’s vehicle, killing 
his multiple bodyguards and driver in the process, and capturing the only remaining survivor 
in Schleyer.84 
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For the RAF, Schleyer was the poster child of a despicable capitalist state. He 
served as president of major industrial associations, and having been a 
member of the SS during the Second World War, he was viewed as a symbol 
of the continuity of Nazism in the West German establishment.85 
Schleyer would remain in RAF captivity for weeks. The RAF demanded the 
exchange of 11 RAF prisoners in return for Schlyer’s freedom.86 The German government, 
headed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt refused despite public pleas made from Schleyer’s 
family and Schleyer himself. The German government would even deny the wealthy 
Schleyer family their request to pay the terrorists a suggested 15 million Deutschmarks in 
personal ransom payment.87 The RAF would subsequently execute Schleyer in late October 
of 1977. Although the German government stuck to its guns, and refused to negotiate with 
the RAF, the death of Hans Martin Schleyer still leaves a somber impression of guilt and 
regret today. In a statement made in 2013, after publicly reconciling with the Schleyer family, 
Schmidt confessed, “Theoretically, we could have taken the RAF’s offer.”88 Schleyer was 
no doubt a high value target of opportunity for the RAF, but he lacked personalized value to 
Chancellor Schmidt. Schmidt’s decision at the time of the event to stand up to the RAF’s 
demands was easier for him to live with for these reasons. 
A few months following the death of Hans Martin Schleyer, on March 16, 1978, 
leftist Red Brigades kidnapped the former Italian prime minister and statesman Aldo Moro. 
Moro was a prime target for abduction because of his involvement in brokering a 
compromise with the Red Brigades that might result in the formulation of a coalition 
government, an idea unfavorable to both extreme members of the Red Brigades and 
conservatives within Italian government.89 “Despite pleas from his friends, family and Pope 
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Paul VI, the Italian government, which had negotiated with the Red Brigades in previous 
situations, refused to negotiate for Moro.”90 As a result, Moro was executed after 55 days of 
captivity. The lack of diplomacy and effort to save Moro on the part of the Italian government 
would lead many to believe that his kidnapping and death were a product of governmental 
conspiracy.91 Unfortunately, Moro presents another example of a poor target choice for 
personalized terrorism effects against the Italian state. Not only was he disliked by both the 
leftist extremists and ultra-conservatives politically, he had no personalized connection to 
key leaders in authority within the Italian government. Moro, much like Schleyer, was not 
considered valuable enough to entertain terrorist demands. 
The kidnappings of both these high-profile men show examples of unsuccessful 
attempts to influence and coerce state governments and their leadership. The RAF and Red 
Brigades incorrectly assumed the German and Italian governments would negotiate for Moro 
and Schleyer. Schleyer’s captivity never personally conflicted Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. 
Schleyer and Schmidt were not related, and may have only had a slight professional 
connection due to their influential careers. These situations lack the emotional weight and 
intimacy of the previous Duarte situation in El Salvador, where the life of a reigning 
president’s daughter is uncertain and pending upon the actions of a decision maker. In either 
the Schleyer or Moro situations, there was no real emotional connection between a decision 
maker or key leader and the victim of terrorism, and therefore effective personalization of 
terrorism never fully existed. The RAF and Red Brigade terrorists did not get what they asked 
for because they attempted to conduct key leader targeting utilizing the incorrect victims. 
The results in these cases still resulted in lethal conclusions for the captives, and 
feelings of prolonged remorse for decision makers. However, in the heat of the moment and 
with the intentions of limiting terrorist kidnapping attempts in the future, political leaders 
made decisions that resulted in the deaths of two prominent public figures. Applying a strictly 
utilitarian process to these European dilemmas, the German and Italian governments seem 
to have achieved a slight victory; displaying to their terrorist foes that their tactics of 
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kidnapping are ineffective and should discontinued. Regardless of this point, the RAF and 
Red Brigades still attempted to use a form of direct terrorism against national level leaders. 
They merely choose the wrong victims to use for leverage against the state. 
2. Wrong Tactics and Right Target: Lord Mountbatten  
On August 27, 1979, the IRA choose to assassinate Lord Louis Mountbatten while 
aboard his fishing near his family’s holiday estate in Mullaghmore, County Sligo, Ireland. 
Before Mountbatten and his family set off on their excursion, the IRA planted a bomb in the 
belly of Mountbatten’s vessel, and remotely detonated the explosive from afar while the boat 
was out to sea. The blast would ultimately kill Mountbatten and three others aboard his boat, 
including one Mountbatten’s teenage grandsons and a local teenager hired to work for 
Mountbatten. Three (Mountbatten’s daughter, son-in-law, and an additional grandson) would 
survive the explosion, suffering severe injuries. Mountbatten was 79 at the time of the attack. 
“Lord Mountbatten was not just another British citizen who was a victim of an IRA 
bombing. His status in Britain was that of a beloved ‘folk hero.’”92 Mountbatten would 
become the IRA’s most “illustrious victim.”93 The IRA had chosen a target intimately 
connected to not only the British crown, but also an individual adored by the British public. 
Mountbatten in his old age was beginning to enjoy retirement following a life-long career as 
a British naval officer and statesman. In his later years, Mountbatten had also risen to 
patriarchal prominence within the British Royal family, providing mentorship and guidance 
to many of the younger royals who adored him.94 By choosing to target Mountbatten, the 
IRA hoped to shake British governance at its core. Mountbatten was not the prime minister, 
the king, or a key leader of government later in his old age, but he did hold enormous personal 
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value within the royal family. He commanded respect and fame through his previous 
achievements and royal status, but at the time of his death he held little active decision-
making within the contemporary world of British foreign policy. Unlike the previous 
European examples of Moro and Schleyer that occurred around the same time, Mountbatten 
was a direct target of influence who held intimate connections to key British leaders, all of 
whom held decision-making power. 
The IRA hoped the killing of Mountbatten would accomplish numerous objectives. 
First, some IRA leadership believed the killing of a prominent British figure via a high-
profile attack in the late 1970s would regenerate more support for their cause. Gerry Adams 
would later state, “In my opinion, the IRA achieved its objective [with the killing of 
Mountbatten]: people started paying attention to what was happening in Ireland.”95 The late 
1970s was a difficult time for the IRA. The IRA struggled to prove they were not a dead 
terrorist organization suffering from organization hardships, effective British CT / COIN 
measures, and the lasting effects of two ceasefires.96 The act of killing Mountbatten and the 
execution of an additional bombing against a British army unit in Warrentpoint the same day 
would certainly make the IRA relevant again and serve as a personalized revenge blow 
against the British. Secondly, the assassination of Mountbatten showed that the IRA was now 
moving away from its indiscriminate bombings campaigns of the past, which alienated the 
public; they were now choosing to target symbols of British authority.97 In taking this 
approach, the IRA sought to strike fear in the hearts of the British monarchy and parliament, 
making them question who could be next on their kill list. Shortly following the death of 
Mountbatten, the IRA released a public statement acknowledging that revenge for the 
oppressive manner in which the British treated suspected IRA members also contributed to 
their target selection, and how the organization now sought to “tear out [Britain’s] 
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sentimental imperialist hearts” with their new style of terrorism.98 The IRA would now strike 
at the personal emotions and fears of key British leaders in their attempt to unify Ireland. The 
best means to achieve this effect would be by targeting subjects of intimate value in British 
policymaker’s lives. Mountbatten was the IRA’s first target along this line of effort. 
Another benefit the IRA sought through this approach was the application of indirect 
pressure towards the British electorate. The IRA sought to show that the media cared more 
for and applied more attention to the life of an aging royal in Mountbatten, rather than it did 
for the hundreds of deaths of its people during the previous years of the Irish conflict.99 Gerry 
Adams would confirm this notion by saying, “it is unfortunate that anyone has to be killed, 
but the furor created by Mountbatten’s death showed the hypocritical attitude of the media 
establishment.”100 If the IRA could successfully plant seeds of doubt within the British 
public, driving a wedge between British subjects and their aristocrats, and ultimately force 
them to second-guess their resolve for Britain’s continued CT and COIN efforts in Ireland, 
British political leaders may start to realize the futility and political suicide of their publicly 
disliked policies. This aspect of informational warfare did not always fully favor the IRA. 
Due to the deaths of children and other family members aboard Mountbatten’s boat that 
August afternoon, the British public and government became more outraged than fearful.101 
Instead of destabilizing British resolve, the IRA solidified it.102 Even though the IRA seemed 
to know that members of Mountbatten’s family or other innocents would be present, thanks 
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to their previous reconnaissance, it did not seem to stop them from carrying out the attack.103 
The additional victims of the attack created more adverse consequences rather than benefits 
for the IRA in the long-term, because they were seen as members of the innocent masses. If 
the IRA sought to incite a British CT and COIN overreaction following the assassination of 
Mountbatten in the late 1970s, they certainly achieved that purpose. The IRA most likely 
hoped that the British government would, in an effort to punish them, overreact and punish 
the people of Ireland indiscriminately, aiding the IRA in gaining additional public 
support.104 British policy towards the IRA for years to come would be marked with 
harshness and aggression. Margret Thatcher would forever take a firm stance against the IRA 
and its terrorism throughout her tenure as Britain’s prime minister.105 “The attack hardened 
the hearts of many Brits against the IRA and convinced Margaret Thatcher’s government to 
take a hardline stance against the terrorist organization.”106 The high profile assassinations 
of Lord Mountbatten and others such as parliamentarian, Airey Neave earlier in 1979, may 
have overstepped British acceptance for personalized terrorism; resulting in greater 
collective determination, rather than disruption from fear. 
In the case of Lord Mountbatten, the IRA did attempt to agitate British governance 
by employing PTT against key leaders. They hoped for the British government to reconsider 
the value of continuing its campaign in Ireland, or cause them to execute overactive CT and 
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COIN mistakes. This attempted application of PTT reinvigorated IRA international 
relevance, sparked British counteractions, and proved the IRA’s capabilities. However, the 
singular act of killing Mountbatten proved inadequate, and did not place the IRA in a position 
of strength or advantage going forward. The IRA seems to have selected the right target in 
this case, but instead of employing a more leverage-gaining tactic like kidnapping, they chose 
the immediate effects of an assassination. The complete opposite occurred in the previous 
examples with Moro and Schleyer, where terrorists attempted to use kidnapping, but 
employed them against incorrect targets. Had the IRA gained possession of Mountbatten and 
the members of his family, they may have been able to project even more debilitating 
personalized pressure and stress towards Thatcher and the monarchy. The IRA should have 
dangled Mountbatten’s life as a bargaining chip against their British adversaries. Instead, the 
British royal family and its government faced the emotion of grief, more so than immediate 
fear. The worst-case scenario had already occurred and the British government was set on 
preventing it from happening again to one of their own. Rather than experiencing real-time 
fear and the personalized pressure of having to consider capitulating to a terrorist’s demands 
to make a situation end, the British royal family and government now held the opportunity 
to counterattack in revenge. The IRA chose the right target for PTT employment, but played 
their hand too soon. 
C. CONTEMPORARY PTT: ISLAMIC TERRORISM 
Islamic terrorist organizations hold a reputation for violence and specular attacks. 
Their kinetic actions are well documented and covered by global media. However, there 
remains much less attention of how these groups use PTT to instill fear and submit competing 
groups and adversaries. The intangible tactics of persuasion used “behind the curtain” and 
out of the media’s eye within the remote valleys of Afghanistan with the Taliban, and in 
Syria and Iraq with ISIS points to an expert application PTT by these groups. Their effects 
are difficult to codify, and often go unnoticed, but are still present and inflict significant 
influence upon the lives of vulnerable people living within these unstable regions. 
1. Taliban Night Letters and the Threat of Violence 
Following is an example of an intimidating Taliban night letter: 
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The Americans may stay for five years, they may stay for ten, but eventually 
they will leave, and when they do, we will come back to this village and kill 
every family that has collaborated with the Americans or the Karzai 
government.107  
The Taliban employs an extremely personalized and direct tactic of intimidation 
through its surgical distribution of shabnamah (night letters). Known mainly for exerting 
influence through brutality and oppression, the Taliban also employs subtle methods of 
intimidation.108 These intimidation tactics “have an effect on the psyche of the people.”109 
These leaflets, commonly disseminated secretly during the night to various Taliban targets 
of persuasion, warn of the wrath their recipients could face should they do not align 
themselves with Taliban objectives.110 These night letters serve multiple purposes. They 
effectively counter indigenous collaboration with coalition and Afghan government forces, 
slow the progression of Westernized educational practices, thwart reconstruction efforts, 
degrade the mobility of the population, and deny stability for any competing groups.111 The 
Taliban have adopted shabnamah as a successful and cost-effective tool of instruction and 
intimidation.112 These night letter campaigns represent an effective instrument for Taliban 
strategic communication, especially within the hostile operational environment of 
Afghanistan.113 
The Taliban learned the successful employment of these intimidating night messages 
from previous experiences and understanding their own culture. Night letters were a useful 
tactic of intimidation and influence for the Afghan mujahedeen in their fight against the 
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Soviet Union.114 These letters have proven effective in Afghanistan with coordinating mass 
resistance activities and collective solidarity against foreign invaders.115 They also have a 
deep history and tradition as an effective form of communication throughout the tribal 
societies found throughout rural Afghanistan.116 Differing from western civilizations, a 
schoolteacher, a village elder, or even a local police officer could serve in a key leader 
capacity within the tribal culture of Afghanistan. The Taliban understands and appreciates 
these aspects of regional history and culture, and therefore relies upon the tactic of 
distributing night letters to key individuals it wants to influence. 
Night letters have proven such effective tools of intimidation that, “many war-weary 
Afghans seeking political asylum in other nations carry with them the nocturnal missives — 
real and counterfeit — in an effort to build a compelling case for their refugee 
application.”117 Weak and vulnerable Afghan provincial and district leaders fall victim to 
Taliban night letters frequently, making it difficult for coalition forces and the central Afghan 
government to build loyalty and lasting allies. These threatening personalized letters force 
these regional leaders to make a critical decision; do they support their government and 
coalitional efforts that hold limited ability to provide them and their loved ones stability and 
security, or should they comply with Taliban demands which provide them with short-term 
rewards and relative safety from direct attacks? Often they choose the second option, and 
they begin implementing pro-Taliban policies and favoritism within their spheres of 
influence, all in an effort to protect themselves and their families from perceived harm and 
harassment. Night letters have become such an effective delivery system of IP terror tactics 
that a relatively new threat and competitor of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Islamic State, 
have also adopted their use. The Islamic state in Khorasan Province’s night letters have begun 
to target the families of Taliban fighters, threating them to remove their sons from the ranks 
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of the Taliban and join their cause instead.118 Key leaders within Afghan society must face 
the personalized intimidation tactics of the Taliban daily. 
2. The Handling of Tribal Dynamics: ISIS Style 
ISIS in its infancy exhibited a strong appreciation for the tactics of manipulation, 
intimidation, and coercion when dealing with individuals or groups it sought to influence. 
ISIS founder, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, forced out of Afghanistan by U.S. forces in 2002, 
found a new home within the Sunni dominated tribes of Iraq and Syria.119 Any new entity 
let alone an aspiring terrorist group, arriving to a region historically dominated by deeply 
rooted tribal dynamics, needs to win over and influence regional tribal leaders to be 
successful. This process is slow and methodical. From 2002–2006 the Islamic State focused 
on building rapport and gathering support from the highly influential Sunni tribes throughout 
the area. However, challenges to the Islamic State’s presumed monopoly on Sunni support 
soon arose with the start of the pro-U.S. Anbar Awaking (Sahwa) movement in Anbar 
Province, Iraq starting in 2006.120 The Islamic State came to realize that it had to formulate 
a counter strategy if it wanted to survive. 
To stabilize the situation and avoid collapse, the leaders of the Islamic State 
took a step back and analyzed their position carefully. To win, they realized 
they had to refocus their effort on regaining support from the Sunni 
community, and these efforts would be at the expense of their war on the 
occupiers and the government. The key to success would be the ability to 
redefine the Sunni identity in Iraq in a manner supportive of the Islamic State, 
and exclusive of its Sahwa challengers. By 2010, the Islamic State’s strategy 
was beginning to see results.121  
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The Islamic State in Iraq’s counter Sahwa strategy was multi-pronged. Its primary 
objective was to incite fear in anyone contemplating aligning with the Sahwa’s cause. An 
ominous slogan found in published Islamic State doctrine presented a powerful warning to 
Muslims questioning their loyalties, stating the ratio of “nine bullets for the apostate, and one 
for the crusader” would be the Islamic State’s prioritization of vengeance and force.122 
Supported by targeted killing and acts of violence, this slogan and strategy struck fear in the 
minds of influential Sunnis, but also reinforced by less kinetic and persuasive tactics. IS 
would commonly offer opportunities for existing members of the Sahwa to repent for their 
previous transgressions or use “carrot and stick” incentive tactics to win back lost Sunni tribal 
allegiances.123 Often instead of targeting an entire tribe, deliberate attempts would be made 
by IS to carefully separate the tribe from individual members or families.124 This approach 
would place individualized pressure upon impressionable target audiences to choose sides. 
The Islamic State understood that direct violence towards its regional Sahwa enemies would 
result in limited effects, or alienate potential supporters. It understood the importance of the 
Sunni tribes to the future survival of its organization and cause. Due to this dynamic, the 
Islamic State chose to utilize a more holistic and personally manipulative approach to win 
back its former supporters, and keep others from fighting against its objectives in the future. 
Additionally, appealing to and manipulating religion is a common IS tactic; designed to 
administer feelings of guilt and powerful metaphysical fear upon target audiences. 
Each time the Islamic State has been physically defeated by superior CT forces and 
the combination of resistance movements like the Sahwa, it has managed to revive itself. It 
has done so by “going to ground,”(targeting the masses less), siding with tribes on various 
disputes, bribing tribal leaders, and exerting direct influence towards the individuals it knows 
it needs to survive.125 The Islamic State showed it learned from its previous use of over 
oppressive and kinetic tactics that resulted in operational failures, and “remedied its mistakes 
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by enculturating or coopting the tribes.”126 The concerns of an Islamic State revival are 
especially relevant today in light of their most recent defeats. They now lack the ability to 
project the same amount of force they had in the past against the masses, and could opt to 
PTT instead against those IS knows it needs to influence and control. 
D. HISTORICAL CONCLUSIONS  
These historic and contemporary terrorism examples provide justification and utility 
for the continued employment of PTT. If past terrorists found IP approaches to be 
strategically logical (regardless of their ultimate failures or successes), they may choose the 
same approaches again. These examples show that the physical acts of a kidnapping and 
intimidation display the visible stains of a terrorist act, but the intangible psychological 
effects that result from these acts are often undertheorized and unappreciated. For the 
persuasive effects of PTT be successful, a terrorist must select a target of value to a key 
leader, and set of tactics that allow them to gain a position of leverage—rather than terrorism 
pressures concluding via premature climax. Future terrorists could reference any of these 
previous examples to mold their current strategies; learning both good and bad practices in 
the execution of PTT. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS 
A. COMBATING PTT 
Appreciating that PTT have always existed throughout the history of terrorism is 
the first step in combating their effect use in the future. A simple acknowledgement of the 
vulnerabilities of human emotions and our primal desire to protect what we value most, 
provides awareness of these ever-present personalized threats. By practicing increased 
personal situational awareness, and a general appreciation of potential threats aimed 
towards key individuals, CT entities can mitigated potential PTT through early warning 
and interdiction. Both institutional level and individual self-awareness to weaknesses 
assists in creating preventative measures to defeat these direct personalized tactics. We 
have to remove the possibilities of terrorists or terrorists groups gaining a marked 
advantage against us by protecting key leaders, objects of value to them, and make PTT 
less personalized when employed. 
1. Protect Key Leaders 
In terms of PTT, security efforts should focus on the vulnerable and potentially 
targeted key individual no matter what environment they are located. Efforts should be 
made to harden their lives in every respect, same as we do with physical infrastructure and 
modes of transportation. These efforts should extend to protecting family members of key 
leaders and now extending to their digital footprints (ex. social media, online bank 
accounts, and biometrics). Access or control a key leader’s physical or intangible objects 
of value must be limited and monitored. Every key leader is emotionally different. An 
influential leader may have an extreme love, affection, or place specific importance on one 
object instead of others. The emotions of fear, embarrassment, and anxiety manifest 
themselves in different way for different people. These vulnerabilities need to be identified 
for each influential leader. By identifying these personal vulnerabilities, security 
professionals and those tasked to protect key leaders, become better prepared to take 
appropriate actions to protect key leaders and their objects of value. 
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Most political leaders benefit from extensive security teams and procedures to 
protect themselves and their families; however, any individual who is influential in society 
or substantial organizations should consider the same protections. These protective 
considerations extend to any influential leaders in societies be they, religious leaders, 
corporate CEOs, or celebrities. If an individual processes the power and influence to effect 
hundreds or thousands of lives, they should take preventative measures to protect 
themselves from PTT. Failing to protect valuable aspects of key leader lives gives terrorists 
an open invitation to attack these indirect targets of opportunity and leverage their value 
against us. 
2. Make the Situation Less Personal 
Often a key leader is unaware, aloof, in denial of, or too preoccupied to focus on 
the personalized terrorism threats they potentially face. This is why supporting casts of 
staff or advisors serve critical roles in the process of PTT prevention and reaction. There 
is no substitute for individualized CT planning and terrorism prevention. Measures should 
be taken to prevent personalized terrorism incidents in general, but also to coordinate 
adequate responses if they should happen to occur.127 Planning and crisis rehearsals can 
limit the shock personalized terrorism events present. To limit the individualized pressure 
and fear that these situations create in a targeted individual, we must reduce the amount of 
personalization. 
President Bartlet in the episode of The West Wing did this quite well, and was aided 
by the already emplaced benefits of the U.S. constitution’s 25th amendment. He effectively 
removed himself from the situational decision-making process, opting to fully assume the 
role of a father and husband, and bestow the duties of president to others not personally 
connected to the terrorist situation. This strategy seems to work, but only if key leaders 
disregard their own hubris and allow this process to occur. Supportive staffs and standard 
operating procedures assist in this process of insulation and isolation. Democracies like the 
U.S. benefit from constitutional law and established regulations of crisis management, 
                                                 
127 Richard Clutterbuck, Kidnap and Ransom: The Response (London and Boston: Faber and Faber, 
1978), 76. 
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while other more autocratic leaders and governments may not have this luxury, and the 
ability to remove a target from the effects of PTT may be difficult to do. Terrorist want 
their targets of IP terror tactics to feel alone, distressed, and make poor decisions based 
purely on their own personal emotions. By removing and providing support to a key leader 
effected by terrorism pressures until they subside or conclude, we are then able to create a 
better decision–making environment to deal with the situation. To make the any 
personalized terrorism situation less personal, key leadership must have collective security 
to protect every aspect of their lives, organizational support, and pre-planned procedures 
to combat PTT. 
B. RESEARCH FINDINGS 
PTT have always existed as a tool for terrorists to use, they are just 
underappreciated. PTT may experience a rise or slight rejuvenation in the future, but it will 
not completely replace terrorist acts against the masses any time soon. Terrorism still relies 
on large-scale shock value, and is commonly fueled by hatred and ideology. The 
practicality of pressure from CT effectiveness, enabling technologies and media available, 
and a history of PTT usage in the past / present may force some terrorists to favor PTT. 
However, terrorists consumed and driven by radical ideology rather than pragmatism will 
still opt to inflict terror upon the masses. The strategic logic, indicators, and historical 
examples highlighted in this thesis could indicate that pragmatic terrorists or terrorist 
organization will adopt more personalized tactics against key leaders, but it will most likely 
not influence terrorist ideologues. Current data does suggest terrorist attacks and their 
lethality are in decline, but that may not directly equate to terrorists opting to employ PTT 
against key leaders instead. The factors identified in his work align with pragmatic 
decision-making processes that only some terrorists and terrorist organization could choose 
to use. For the radicalized and strictly ideologically driven terrorist, these indicators may 
prove irrelevant. For these reasons, it is most important to understand the presence of PTT, 
their use as a tailorable option in future rationally driven terrorism campaigns, and its 
effectiveness if employed against the correct targets of critical influence. 
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